Solving the coal puzzle

Lessons from four years of coal phase-out policy in Europe

Playing With Fire

An assessment of company plans to burn biomass in EU coal power stations

The A-B-C of BCAs

An overview of the issues around introducing Border Carbon Adjustments in the EU

Coal mine methane leaks are worse for climate change than all shipping and aviation

New IEA World Energy Outlook shows coal mine methane leaks add up to a third to emissions from coal

Coal Free Kingdom

UK election manifestos should commit to take the UK fully coal-free, including in industry, finance, and domestic heating – ready for next year’s COP26 in Glasgow

The cash cow has stopped giving: Are Germany’s lignite plants now worthless?

Our new research finds German lignite gross profits collapsed 54% so far in 2019. With lignite now loss-making, the case for Gov. compensation has collapsed

The ESR flexibility repair kit

The ESR flexibility repair kit

Click here to view our briefing on ESR flexibilities

With the latest proposals for the design of flexibilities in the Effort Sharing Regulation, there is a risk that member states will first exhaust the ‘external’ flexibilities (with the EU ETS and the LULUCF sector), before using the options of cooperation with other Member States within the ESR. This has several drawbacks:

  • It reduces the incentives for reductions in the Effort Sharing sectors, risking to set them off track towards more ambitious long-term targets;
  • As the additionality of the external flexibilities is questionable (especially in the case of the EU ETS), there’s an increased risk that the EU will miss its agreed reduction targets for 2030;
  • The ‘external’ flexibilities don’t have the same co-benefits as cooperation between Member States under the ESR, such as technology transfer, job creation and economic convergence.

This briefing puts forward three tools to repair the flexibilities under the ESR:

  1. The ‘external’ flexibilities (with the EU ETS and LULUCF sectors) should only be accessible as a solution of last resort, after member states have exhausted their ESR budget (including any banked allowances);
  2. The use of a European Project Mechanism should be recognized and recommended, or better yet, required as a basis for transfers between Member States;
  3. More transparency is needed on concluded transfers between Member States, in order to allow price discovery and facilitate further cooperation.

 

Cover photo by Anthony Da Cruz on Unsplash used under Creative Commons license.