Carbon Fat Cats – Company Analysis of the EU ETS

This report presents company level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme for 2008 and looking ahead till 2012 when the current phase of trading ends.

Anna Pearson

4 March 2010 | 3 min read

About

The EU ETS was set up ‘to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a ‘cost-effective and economically efficient manner’ as a centrepiece of European efforts to tackle climate change. However, our company level analysis has uncovered a number of trends which have serious implications for the short and long term future of the ETS.

Executive summary

Many companies have far more permits to pollute than they require

These companies are not required to make cuts to their CO2 and can bank the permits for use in future phases of trading, insulating them from the need to make cuts to their CO2 emissions going forward

This report presents company level analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme for 2008 and looking ahead till 2012 when the
current phase of trading ends.

The EU ETS was set up ‘to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a ‘cost-effective and economically efficient manner’ as a centrepiece of European efforts to tackle climate change. However, our company level analysis has uncovered a number of trends which have serious implications for the short and long term future of the ETS.

Carbon Fat Cat Companies


For Phase 2 of the EU ETS running from 2008 to 2012 companies are to receive free allocations of EUA permits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2 emitted. As a result of generous allocations compounded by the impact of the global recession, many companies now find themselves in a position where they have far more permits to pollute than they require. Whether or not these companies choose to sell the permits to generate windfall profits they have been effectively handed significant assets by Member State governments across the EU – thus we have termed these
companies, ‘Carbon Fat Cats’.

  • The top ten Carbon Fat Cats share between them 35 million surplus EUA permits in 2008 equivalent to the annual emissions of Latvia and Lithuania. The permits are worth an estimated €500 million at current carbon prices.
  • Looking ahead to 2012 the Carbon Fat Cats will share an estimated 230 million surplus EUA permits worth €3.2 billion a sum far greater than the investment in renewable and clean technology for the same period, or indeed the EU Commission’s budget for environment as a whole.

These companies are not required to make cuts to their CO2 and as EU ETS rules allow permits to be banked for use in future phases of trading and are likely to be insulated from the need to make cuts to their CO2 emissions going forward. Our findings run strongly counter to recent claims from industry groups that stronger climate change targets would damage competitiveness.

Within Sector Analysis


For key industrial sectors covered by the EU ETS we found that whilst the majority of companies were over-allocated, benefitting far more than others, and some were in the opposite position with shortages of permits. For instance, whilst the cement sector was universally over-allocated, some companies within the Iron and Steel sector did not have enough permits to cover their emissions. The findings have important implications for the implementation of Phase 3 of emissions trading and raise questions as to whether EU companies are operating within a level playing field.

The power sector, on the other hand, is acting as a powerhouse for CO2 reductions with analysis showing how a very small number of companies are required to deliver the majority of emissions reductions for the EU ETS as a whole and to compensate for the industrial surpluses.

  • RWE and EON, the two companies most short of permits were required to carry out or pay for more equivalent emissions reductions than the net reductions for the scheme as a whole.
  • The top six power companies short of permits were required to provide or pay for emissions reductions equivalent to the whole of the net ETS power sector reductions.

However, with most power companies buying EUA permits to comply with the ETS and passing the cost of compliance to EU power consumers; it is likely that EU citizens are unwittingly paying what amounts to a subsidy to industry without any cuts to CO2 emissions taking place.

Recommendations


We recommend the following measures to prevent the ‘hangover effect’ of surplus permits from the current phase of emissions trading, from weakening the future impact and effectiveness of the EU ETS in cutting CO2 emissions.

1. Higher ambition with regard to targets:

The evidence of high surpluses amongst many industrial sectors and companies demonstrates that Europe can afford to go further in terms of the ambition it has set for the scheme.

2. Taking action to spur more investment in solutions:

With surplus permits watering down investment signals and the strength incentives for ETS participants to invest in abatement the ETS needs to be tightened.

  • Access to overseas offsets ought to be limited in order to drive greater carbon scarcity and thus investment in domestic abatement.
  • Permits held by Member States in their new entrants’ reserves should be cancelled rather than being released for sale.
  • The EU should consult on measures and incentives to ensure that of the billions of Euros in asset value place in the hands companies, some is directed towards low carbon investment.

A radical approach to address the problems raised by surplus permits would be to remove industrial sectors from the Emissions Trading Scheme altogether, instead making them subject to regulation on the best available technologies and carbon intensity standards relevant to them.

3. Revisiting the design of Phase 3:

Decisions relating to carbon leakage, benchmarking and levels of auctioning to the power sector should be revised and adjusted to take into account the levels of surplus permits from Phase 2. Whilst it is not easy to make these adjustments, failure to act will lock-in the problems that the process of free permit allocation has created thus far and competitive distortions between companies.

4. Better data and better analysis:

The EU must improve its monitoring of how the scheme by requiring and reporting on company level performance under the scheme. This will improve transparency and the quality of analysis on the ETS as a whole.

We offer these solutions to policymakers as a way to increase the effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and hope that they will stimulate and inform the on-going debate about the future of the scheme.